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95S. Huang et al. / China Economic Review 33 (2015) 94–110reﬂect not only differentiated economic regional development but are also further reinforced by the continued implementation of the
hukou system of household registration which restricts labor and residential mobility.1
The large regional economic differentials appear on the background of a high degree of economic decentralization. This is
highlighted by Xu (2010) who describes China as a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. He points out that while the central
government controls the key political appointments at all levels, it allows regional governments to run their economic affairs largely
unimpeded. This, he argues, has emerged as a product of political upheavals and purges during the Great Leap Forward and, especially,
the Cultural Revolution. During these turbulent periods, the Soviet-inspired centralizedmodelwas abandoned and instead the regions
were encouraged to competewith each other. The resulting inter-regional competitionwas aimed primarily atmaximizing output but
it also fostered experimentationwith respect to production arrangements and policies. This decentralization continued andwas even
reinforced during the reform period. Arguably, a particularly dramatic step in this direction was the creation of the special economic
zones (SEZs) in the early years of liberalization.2 This effectively introduced a two-speed system, allowing selected regions to charge
ahead in economic liberalization while the rest of the Chinese economy proceeded more cautiously. In turn, this laid the foundations
of the subsequent economic gaps between the coastal areas and the rest of the country.3
In this paper, we document the depth of economic integration among Chinese provinces and analyze the factors that foster such
integration. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we use a structural vector auto-regressive (SVAR) model to identify province-
speciﬁc shocks between 1955 and 2011.4 Ourmethodology allows us to distinguish between shocks that have a temporary vs perma-
nent effect on output, typically referred to as demand and supply shocks, respectively. We compute the correlations between these
shocks for all pairs of provinces for four sub-periods: two before and two after the 1978 liberalization. These correlations capture
the intensity of integration, and the changes therein, amongChina's provinces over a period duringwhich the country gradually aban-
doned central planning, state ownership aswell asMaoism. Second,we analyze the determinants of these correlations using a stylized
version of the gravity model (broadly in line with Artis and Okubo (2010 and 2011), although they use a different methodology for
estimating business-cycle correlations). In particular, we seek to explain the correlations of shocks by relating them to the factors
that proxy for the vulnerability of regions to idiosyncratic shocks, and the factors that can facilitate inter-regional transmission of
the effects of such shocks. The latter include endowments of physical and human capital, transport infrastructure, structure of the eco-
nomic activity, openness to foreign trade, foreign direct investment, geography, and economic policy. We also include variables that
are likely to be correlated with inter-provincial trade. This analysis is carried out for the same four sub-periods so as to capture the
determinants of economic integration in the various periods, and the changes therein.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. First, the demand and supply shocks have evolved differently in the course of the Chinese
reforms: demand shocks appear to have become more synchronized over time while supply shocks have grown more dissimilar.
Second, we ﬁnd that factors that proxy for interprovincial trade and account for the similarity in factor endowments tend to make
shocks more symmetric. Rather surprisingly, foreign trade and inward FDI have had little effect on the symmetry of shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section brieﬂy discusses what we know about economic integration
and decentralization in China. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the main empirical ﬁnding
and Section 5 states the conclusions.
2. China's economic integration
2.1. Economic decentralization under Mao and Deng
During the period from the communist takeover in 1949 until 1978, the Chinese economy was tightly regulated: output quotas,
resource allocations and prices were set centrally according to a plan formulated by the central government. This reﬂected the initial
desire of Mao Zedong's government to follow the Soviet model of organizing the economy. However, as argued by Xu (2010), China
started to deviate from the Soviet model during the economic and political upheavals of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Rather than plan and regulate the economic activity from the center, the central government
granted wide-ranging economic autonomy to the provincial governments. This was to encourage the regions to compete with each
other in order to deliver or exceed their quota of output. As a result, China became a collection of regional economies rather than a
single centrally-planned Soviet-type economy, with the central government in Beijing retaining control over political appointments
and decisions while devolving much of economic policy making to the provinces.
The decentralization accelerated further after Mao's death in 1976.5 The objective was to reinvigorate the stagnant economy by
improving incentives and encouraging local initiative in the production (Tang, 1998). The ﬁscal and economic decentralization has1 More precisely, the hukou system divides the population into urban and rural residents, and restricts the access of rural residents to public services including
healthcare, education, pension insurance and unemployment insurance in case they move to urban regions.
2 On the history of SEZs and the role they have played in Chinese economic development, see Chen, Goh, Sun, and Xu (2011), and the references therein.
3 An especially poignant example of the fruits of this policy is Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong, whose population exploded from around 300,000 to its current 14mil-
lion since it became the ﬁrst special economic zone more than 30 years ago.
4 The use of structural VARs to assess the intensity of economic integration between countries or regions was pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) whose
workwas in turnmotivated by the Theory of OptimumCurrency Areas (henceforth OCA;Mundell, 1961). Bayoumi and Eichengreen applied thismethodology to assess
themerits of adopting the common currency in the European Union. They sought to identify which European countries encounter shocks that are predominantly sym-
metric or asymmetric in nature, as the OCA theory suggests that monetary integration is less costly if it involves countries that are subject to symmetric shocks. Since
their seminal contribution, this method has been used for assessing other countries or integration projects as well, see Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003, 2006), de Haan,
Inklaar, and Jong-A-Pin (2008a), and the references therein.
5 For example, the central government's share of expenditures declined from 51% in 1978 to 28% in 1993 (Ma and Norregaard, 1998).
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has also allowed some local governments to implement protectionist policies, ostensibly with the objective to develop their local
economies (Bai, 1981).
Another important change that took place after Mao's death was the liberalization of the economy. This was initiated by Deng
Xiaoping in 1978 and was designed to be gradual not only with respect to time but also in space. Initially, the liberalization favored
the coastal regions and fostered their development ahead of the rest of the country. Most notably, the central government directed
foreign investment to a handful of SEZs, all ofwhichwere located on the cost. In effect, the SEZswere allowed to be increasingly driven
bymarket forceswhile central planning remained in force in the rest of the country. After the SEZs proved successful, liberal policies
were gradually extended beyond them, ﬁrst throughout the coastal provinces and later throughout all of China. This helped
stimulate the rapid development of the coastal regions and increased their competitiveness compared to the interior (Poncet,
2005). At the same time, the inland provinces continued to export raw materials to the coastal areas at ﬁxed (low) prices,
which translated to a net transfer of resources from the interior regions to the manufacturing provinces on the coast. The less
developed regions responded by pursuing a policy of industrialization through import substitution, as decentralization com-
bined with the fact that most of the tax revenue accrued from industrial production made them keen to develop their industrial
base (Lee, 1998; Poncet, 2005).
An important element of the Maoist regimewas the household registration (hukou) system, which severely restricts the ability of
Chinese citizens tomove and even travelwithin China. Under this system, each personwas tied to a particular area and couldmove to
a different area only with the permission of the authorities of both origin and destination regions. Despite progressively accelerating
economic liberalization, the hukou system has remained in place even after 1978. Unlike during theMaoist period, rural workers now
canmove to and take up jobs in the urban areas. However, changing their hukou to the destination region remainsdifﬁcult. Thismeans
that they can only receive public services in their region of origin: health care eligibility, children's education and pension claims,most
notably, are not portable. Despite this, labor mobility has been steadily increasing, especially from the inland rural to coastal urban
regions (Tang, 1998).
In all, China is an economywith a single currency but capital or labor are not perfectly mobile. Its provinces are subject to central-
ized political rule but are growing more and more decentralized on the economic front.2.2. Asymmetric shocks in China
Howwell integrated is the Chinese economy? A common approach for assessing the intensity of integration is based on examining
the similarity of business cycles. Compared with other approaches, the business-cycle approach has several advantages. It not only
provides a comprehensive measure of the various factors that contribute to economic integration but it can reveal also whether
there are any regional groups of the provincial economies that are highly integrated (Tang, 1998).
A number of approaches have been utilized to assess the degree of asymmetry of shocks across economies. When analyzing the
integration of the Chinese economy, methodological approaches initially developed in the international context are often applied
in inter-regional context as well.6 One method is based on considering correlations of growth rates, inﬂation rates, exchange rates,
interest rates and/or stock prices. The weakness of this method is that it does not allow one to distinguish between the shocks them-
selves and the reactions to them. For example, Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008) investigate business cycles and their determinants by
identifying the cyclical component of monthly provincial gross output over 1991–2004. They ﬁnd that despite a cleavage existing
between the coastal and interior regions, business-cycle synchronization increased from a rather low level at the beginning
of the 1990s to a level comparable to that of the U.S. at the beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, they argue that international
trade and local economic policy foster synchronization. However, Herrmann-Pillath, Libman, and Yu (2010) argue that this ﬁnd-
ing may be attributable to the speciﬁc macroeconomic environment during the period analyzed and as such it cannot be gener-
alized into the future.
Another popular method is to identify shocks using the SVAR model, as put forward by Blanchard and Quah (1989). This
model allows the analyst to identify both shocks and the economic responses to them. This method has become a popular
tool for identifying asymmetric shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) to assess the similarities of
economic cycles in Europe in the run-up to the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (Babetskii, 2005).
The SVAR methodology allows one to distinguish between shocks that affect both output and price level permanently (supply
shocks) and those affecting output only temporarily while having a permanent price-level effect (demand shocks). The
literature studying the business-cycle synchronization of the Chinese economy using the SVAR method remains very limited,
however. Tang (1998) adopts this model to gauge the degree of economic integration within China using data on industrial out-
put and the retail price index. He argues that a high degree of integration prevails in Eastern China only. This ﬁnding has been
also replicated by Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008).
Gerlach-Kristen (2009) uses a differentmethodology: she identiﬁes the common component in output gapﬂuctuations at the pro-
vincial level by using principal component analysis. She ﬁnds that the degree of synchronization varies over time: while it was high6 Since the international and intra-national contexts are fundamentally different, although we follow this approach as well, we cannot draw direct comparisons be-
tween results that we obtain in inter-regional analysis of China with those obtained with international data. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
Table 1
Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, East.
Provinces 1955–1965 1966–1977 1978–1991 1992–2011
Beijing GDP 36.93 76.70 238.30 1432.51
growth 6.53% 8.85% 9.22% 11.07%
Tianjin GDP 27.02 50.97 139.74 957.59
growth 6.58% 5.94% 8.47% 13.76%
Shanghai GDP 95.55 199.93 555.74 3454.18
growth 7.92% 7.27% 8.00% 11.79%
Liaoning GDP 99.16 176.40 483.82 2575.72
growth 5.25% 7.55% 8.17% 11.24%
Shandong GDP 61.41 125.05 416.32 3550.36
growth 3.56% 7.84% 10.29% 13.28%
Jiangsu GDP 59.28 109.52 394.49 3623.28
growth 4.38% 4.01% 9.28% 12.24%
Zhejiang GDP 39.20 63.69 256.24 2356.09
growth 5.22% 4.68% 12.84% 13.25%
Fujian GDP 23.09 36.36 131.56 1293.00
growth 5.64% 4.93% 12.13% 13.79%
Guangdong GDP 47.08 79.52 269.66 2769.64
growth 4.65% 4.93% 12.20% 13.25%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: ‘Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China’, China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books.
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the inland provinces in Northern and Northeastern China tend to be less inﬂuenced by the national business cycle.
In summary, the evidence so far, as limited as it is, suggests that the Chinese provincial business cycles have becomemore synchro-
nized over time but this process has not been uniform. In particular, a gapmay be emerging between the coastal and interior regions,
with the former becoming more integrated over time, unlike the latter.
2.3. Determinants of business-cycle co-movements
There is no consensus as to which determinants of business-cycle co-movement are important. There are instead many potential
candidate explanations of business-cycle synchronization or the lack thereof. One leading candidate is trade. Frankel and Rose (1998)
show empirically that higher bilateral trade between two countries leads to greater correlation of business cycles between them. An
opposite view is put forward by Krugman (1993) who argues that international trade increases specialization, making shocks more
asymmetric. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that inter-industry and intra-industry trade play different roles in this respect. The former
reﬂects specialization and therefore may cause asymmetries. The latter implies that the country simultaneously exports and imports
products of the same category. The total effect of trade intensity on business-cycle correlation is therefore theoretically ambiguous and
the question can only be answered empirically. Fidrmuc (2004) adopts the approach of Frankel and Rose (1998) and applies it to a
cross section of OECD countries over the last ten years with quarterly data, controlling for intra-industry trade in his analysis. His ﬁnd-
ings conﬁrm the Frankel and Rose view. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), similarly, argue that trade is the only factor with a robust ef-
fect on business cycle synchronization. In contrast, de Haan, Inklaar, and Jong-A-Pin (2008b) posit that the role of trade is less
important than suggested by this literature.
However, trade and business cycle correlation may be endogenous. Therefore, many studies use instruments taken from gravity
models to identify the relationship between business cycles and trade. Alternatively, one can include the instruments directly in
the regression equation. The gravity model relates bilateral trade ﬂows to variables such as distance between regions, common lan-
guage, common border, and so on. Therefore, gravity-model variables can be, in turn, used as proxies for trade and therefore can be
used as determinants of business-cycle synchronization: see, among others, Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon, Chong, and
Stein (2007) and Fidrmuc (2004).
Imbs (1998, 2003, 2004) and others point out the positive relationship between similarity in the structure of output and business-
cycle synchronization. The presence of this relationship was conﬁrmed in empirical analyses using regional data by Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sorensen, Reshef, and Yosha (2001) and Clark and vanWincoop (2001). Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001), in particular, ﬁnd that U.S. states
that are more specialized in turn display a lower correlation of business cycles with the aggregate U.S. growth.
Fatás (1997) argues that the coordination of monetary and ﬁscal policies is a key determinant of business-cycle synchronization.
He points out that it has an ambiguous impact on business cycles since it depends on the type of shocks driving economic ﬂuctuations
and the ability of governments to stabilize output. If macroeconomic policies are the source of business cycles, more coordinated pol-
icy could lead to higher synchronization. Darvas, Rose, and Szapary (2005) and Artis, Fidrmuc, and Scharler (2008) investigate and
conﬁrm this based on the European Union data while Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008) and Lan and Sylwester (2010) obtain similar
ﬁndings with Chinese regional data.
Furthermore, factor endowments also drew attention of scholars. Most theories, such as the Heckscher–Ohlin model, Ricardian
theories and models with differentiated products, predict a signiﬁcant relationship among factor endowments and business-cycle
co-movement.
Table 2
Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, Center.
Provinces 1955–1965 1966–1977 1978–1991 1992–2011
Hebei GDP 54.21 99.76 308.50 2198.00
growth 3.22% 7.95% 9.07% 12.15%
Shanxi GDP 32.87 50.39 139.63 726.65
growth 6.19% 4.31% 8.58% 10.95%
Inner-Mongolia GDP 26.49 39.23 111.49 810.98
growth 5.96% 3.96% 9.48% 13.73%
Jilin GDP 29.04 49.16 133.00 787.42
growth 5.94% 4.70% 8.98% 11.96%
Heilongjiang GDP 49.40 89.47 203.39 902.02
growth 6.24% 5.40% 7.11% 10.11%
Anhui GDP 28.77 45.34 111.86 729.74
growth 3.04% 4.43% 7.86% 12.77%
Jiangxi GDP 26.36 41.23 107.76 712.47
growth 4.38% 4.01% 9.28% 12.24%
Henan GDP 42.33 76.36 231.06 1513.67
growth 1.67% 6.10% 9.88% 12.08%
Hunan GDP 42.93 71.90 188.23 1030.73
growth 4.36% 5.82% 8.33% 11.49%
Hubei GDP 41.81 64.54 196.95 1265.32
growth 7.21% 4.57% 9.53% 12.31%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: ‘Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China’, China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books.
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3.1. Chinese provincial data
China is administratively divided into 31 regions: 22 provinces, 5 autonomous ethnic-minority regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Guanxi,
Ningxia and Inner Mongolia)7 and 4 metropolitan provinces (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). For simplicity, we refer to
all of them as provinces in the remainder of the paper. Our sample covers 28 provinces for which data are available.8 Annual data
are available for the period from 1952 to 2011. Provincial real GDP growth and the GDP deﬂator are obtained from nominal and
real GDP indexes published by the Bureau of National Statistics of China.9 We test all variables for unit roots using the Augmented
and GLS Dickey–Fuller tests and obtain clear rejections of the null of unit root for ﬁrst differences of output and prices for all
provinces.10
We subdivide the sample into three geographical regions: East, Center andWest. Besides reﬂecting geography, this categorization
also broadly captures the differences in the degree of economic development. During the early transition period, the coastal areas in
the East were themain beneﬁciaries of the open door policy, developingmuchmore quickly than the interior areas in the Center
andWest. This regional break-down is conﬁrmed by Herrerias and Ordoñez (2012) who identify convergence clubs among Chi-
nese provinces with respect to income per capita, labor productivity and capital intensity: although their research yields ﬁve
clubs, their borders approximately overlap with the three regions that we use. Furthermore, we divide the period covered by
the data into four sub-periods: 1955–1965, 1966–1977, 1978–1991 and 1992–2011. This break-down reﬂects the main phases
of China's economic and political development. The ﬁrst two sub-periods correspond to the early and late Maoism. The early
Maoist period includes the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) while the late Maoist period coincides with the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976). The economic liberalization was initiated in 1978. It accelerated further following Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour
in 1992. We therefore treat this year as the start of a new phase of China's reform process (see also Fleisher, Li, and Zhao (2009);
Xu (2007)). Tables 1–3 report some basic statistics on the three regions and the four sub-periods.
3.2. Identiﬁcation of shocks
In this subsection, we present the methodology used to identify province-speciﬁc structural shocks. We use a SVARmodel with two
variables: the log-difference of output (annual real GDP) and the log-differences of prices (annual GDP deﬂator), Y=(ΔGDPt, ΔPt)'. It is
assumed that theﬂuctuations in these two variables result from two types of disturbances: supply and demand shocks. This terminology7 Autonomous regions are those with a high share of a particular ethnic minority: Tibetans (Tibet), Uyghurs (Xinjiang), Zhuangs (Guangxi), Huis (Ningxia) and
Mongols (Inner Mongolia). According to the Chinese constitution, autonomous regions should enjoy more legal autonomy although this is hardly the case in practice.
8 Tibet, Hainan and Chongqing are excluded due to missing data. In the cases of Hainan and Chongqing, this is because these are new provinces, created recently by
splitting away from Sichuan and Guangdong, respectively. For the same reason, we are unable to use data on Sichuan before the forming of Chongqing as a separate
entity. Finally, we drop Tibet as almost no data is available on this province.
9 We used the following publications: ‘Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China’, China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statis-
tical books.
10 The test results are available upon request.
Table 3
Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, West.
Provinces 1955–1965 1966–1977 1978–1991 1992–2011
Guangxi GDP 23.48 43.24 112.73 681.26
growth 5.36% 6.61% 7.84% 11.93
Sichuan GDP – – 223.28 1236.55
growth – – .85% .89%
Guizhou GDP 14.89 18.91 61.93 292.73
growth 3.27% 3.86% 10.19% 10.19%
Yunnan GDP 21.93 35.26 104.66 539.47
growth 4.81% 4.11% 10.33% 10.15%
Shaanxi GDP 24.81 46.63 137.51 763.34
growth 5.12% 6.19% 9.48% 11.26%
Gansu GDP 19.26 37.21 101.80 540.26
growth 3.76% 6.84% 8.44% 10.45%
Ningxia GDP 4.12 10.35 30.60 154.32
growth 8.61% 8.44% 8.89% 10.57%
Qinghai GDP 4.41 8.31 20.88 94.56
growth 7.83% 7.19% 6.93% 10.72%
Xinjiang GDP 16.92 24.46 77.54 428.61
growth 8.09% 3.11% 10.99% 9.88%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: ‘Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China’, China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books.
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ply, lead to permanent changes in both real output and prices. Demand shocks have also short-term effects on both output and prices.
However, since in the long-run the aggregate supply curve is vertical, demand shocks do not have any long-term effect on the level of
output and become fully absorbed by price-level adjustments.Table 4
Weighted-average correlation of supply shocks by province.
Region Province name 1955–1965 1966–1977 1978–1991 1992–2011
East Beijing 0.61 0.56 0.42 0.28
Tianjin 0.78 0.38 0.44 0.23
Shanghai 0.68 0.35 0.50 0.34
Liaoning 0.78 0.32 0.41 −0.29
Shandong 0.63 0.39 0.47 0.27
Jiangsu 0.39 0.54 0.38 0.27
Zhejiang 0.69 0.11 0.54 0.37
Fujian 0.70 0.36 0.49 0.38
Guangdong 0.66 0.35 0.38 0.41
Median East 0.68 0.36 0.44 0.28
Central Hebei 0.71 0.44 0.51 0.30
Shanxi 0.78 0.51 0.25 0.10
Inner-Mongolia 0.64 0.49 0.23 0.08
Jilin 0.74 0.50 0.35 0.29
Heilongjiang 0.78 0.41 0.38 −0.04
Anhui 0.47 −0.08 −0.21 0.06
Jiangxi 0.43 0.46 0.39 0.35
Henan 0.72 0.36 0.20 −0.09
Hunan 0.78 0.53 0.38 0.34
Hubei 0.72 0.50 0.37 0.24
Median Center 0.72 0.48 0.36 0.17
West Guangxi 0.76 0.25 0.40 0.44
Sichuan – – 0.47 0.27
Guizhou 0.82 0.36 0.29 0.02
Yunnan 0.62 0.40 0.39 0.24
Shaanxi 0.78 0.38 0.43 −0.06
Gansu 0.61 0.20 0.35 0.22
Ningxia 0.58 0.32 0.31 −0.17
Qinghai 0.70 0.24 0.39 0.16
Xinjiang 0.59 0.52 0.28 0.27
Median West 0.70 0.36 0.39 0.22
Median China 0.70 0.39 0.39 0.27
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
Table 5
Weighted-average correlation of demand shocks by province.
Region Province name 1955–1965 1966–1977 1978–1991 1992–2011
East Beijing 0.02 0.04 0.44 0.66
Tianjin 0.25 0.20 0.49 0.76
Shanghai 0.20 0.15 0.34 0.75
Liaoning −0.18 0.18 0.19 0.59
Shandong 0.24 0.08 0.20 0.63
Jiangsu −0.07 0.18 0.38 0.80
Zhejiang 0.28 0.07 0.42 0.78
Fujian 0.19 −0.13 0.48 0.73
Guangdong 0.20 0.09 0.37 0.73
Median East 0.20 0.09 0.38 0.73
Central Hebei 0.18 0.08 0.50 0.77
Shanxi 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.73
Inner-Mongolia 0.07 −0.02 0.44 0.77
Jilin 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.66
Heilongjiang 0.13 0.29 0.23 0.81
Anhui −0.18 0.28 0.40 0.70
Jiangxi 0.22 0.15 0.46 0.74
Henan −0.05 0.28 0.38 0.77
Hunan 0.22 −0.18 0.38 0.81
Hubei 0.10 0.10 0.39 0.78
Median Center 0.12 0.13 0.40 0.77
West Guangxi 0.15 0.01 0.53 0.76
Sichuan – – 0.32 0.73
Guizhou 0.25 0.16 0.53 0.76
Yunnan 0.20 −0.19 0.30 0.69
Shaanxi 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.74
Gansu 0.18 −0.22 0.21 0.51
Ningxia 0.19 −0.04 0.48 0.77
Qinghai 0.15 −0.11 0.40 0.77
Xinjiang −0.06 −0.15 0.39 0.70
Median West 0.18 −0.04 0.39 0.74
Median China 0.18 0.09 0.39 0.74
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
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model involving real output growth and price-level growth:11 StazYt ¼ B1Yt−1 þ B2Yt−1 þ…þ BkYt−k þ et ð1Þwhere B are matrices of estimated coefﬁcients with k lags, and e= (ety, etp)′ are i. i. d. disturbances. This model can be represented by
the following inﬁnite vector moving average (VMA) processYt ¼ et þ B1et−1 þ… ¼
X∞
i¼
CiL
iet ð2ÞThe VAR disturbances are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, but they may and usually are contemporaneously correlated.
Therefore, we decompose them into structural shocks which are orthogonal and which fulﬁll the theoretical properties derived
from the AS-AD model,11Yt ¼ A0εt þ A1εt−1 þ… ¼
X∞
i¼
AiL
iεt ð3Þwhere ε= (εD, εS)′ is a vector of demand and supply shocks, respectively. This implies that unexplainable components of output
growth and inﬂation are driven by supply and demand shocks. The vector of unobservable structural disturbances, ε, can be obtained
from Eqs. (2) and (3), which gives et = A0εt. Correspondingly, the variance–covariance matrix of VAR residuals can be presented as
Σe= A0ΣεA0−1. Thus, the structural shocks can be derived from the variance–covariance matrix of residuals, e, and the normalization
of variance–covariancematrix of structural shocks,Σε, to the identitymatrix.Moreover,we impose the restriction that demand shocks
have no long-term impact on the level of output,∑
∞
i¼0
ci;11εDt−i ¼ 0.ka (2006), among others, describes the Blanchard–Quah decomposition in more detail.
Fig. 1. Interprovince correlation of supply shocks. Notes: The horizontal axis shows correlation coefﬁcients while the vertical axis reports the number of observations
(province pairs) with that correlation. Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
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Having estimated the demand and supply shocks affecting the individual provinces, we calculate ρijτS and ρijτD , the correlation of
supply and demand shocks between any two provinces i and j during sub-period (2.925). If the correlation of shocks is positive,
the shocks are considered to be symmetric and if it is negative, they are asymmetric. Tables 4 and 5 give the weighted-average
(with GDP used as weights) correlations of supply and demand shocks for each province and for each sub-period. The tables also
report the median ﬁgures for each region and sub-period and for China as a whole.12 Fig. 1 depicts the distribution of bilateral
cross correlations of supply shocks for the four sub-periods while Fig. 2 provides the same information for demand shocks. It is
clear that the nature of shocks is changing over time. However, the change is not the same for the two kinds of shocks. In particular,
the correlations of supply shocks display a lower degree of business-cycle synchronization during themore recent periods. The China-
wide median falls considerably, from 0.70 to 0.27 during the period covered by our analysis. In contrast, the development of demand
shocks suggests a greater degree of synchronization in the later periods. The China-wide median correlation more than quadruples,
from 0.18 to 0.74. Rather remarkably, the China-wide pattern is mirrored also in the change of the regional medians, both for supply
and demand shocks, suggesting that this divergent development of supply and demand shock is not limited only to a subset of prov-
inces. There are some outliers, such as the deeply-negative correlation of supply shocks for Liaoning in the latest sub-period.13 Hence,
depending on which type of shocks we look at, Chinese provinces either appear to have become more closely integrated or have
grown increasingly apart since the reforms have been implemented.
The focus on the symmetry of shocks is at the core of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961). If shocks are
sufﬁciently symmetric, the argument goes, the countries or regions sharing the same currency will have little need for independent
monetary policy.With asymmetric shocks, policy preferences can diverge: a region hit by a negative shockwould prefer expansionary
monetary policy while that affected by a positive shock would be in favor of a monetary tightening. The OCA theory, however, con-
siders only the overall symmetry of shocks, without dwelling on the distinction between demand and supply shocks. Therefore, it12 The provincialﬁgures forming the regionalmedians are depicted by italics in the tables. Note that the Central region has an evennumber of provinces so that two of
them were used to compute the median value for that region; both are in italics in the table while their average is reported as the median.
13 There are several factors which can explain the result for this province. First, Liaoning used to be one of themost heavily industrialized areas of China, with its econ-
omy following the Sovietmodelwith an emphasis on heavy industry. As such, itwas heavily reliant on imports of resources at below-market prices from the other prov-
inces. The imports of cheap resources largely ceased during the reform period, which resulted in decline of Liaoning's economy at a time when other provinces were
doingwell. Second, Liaoning is at the borderwith North Korea and the famine in that country (and the ensuing refugee inﬂux) could have inﬂuenced also the economy
of the Northeast region of China.
Table 6
Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, Maoist period.
1955–1965 1966–1977
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0.044 0.077 0.009 0.017
(0.042) (0.089) (0.063) (0.082)
Coast dummy − 0.107∗ ∗ − 0.228∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.060 − 0.094
(0.047) (0.092) (0.064) (0.082)
Same-region dummy 0.044 0.073 0.067 0.109
(0.032) (0.066) (0.050) (0.066)
Coast-interior dummy − 0.030 − 0.087 0.054 0.063
(0.067) (0.130) (0.096) (0.122)
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0.020 0.026 0.008 0.016
(0.011) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023)
Economic size [logYi + logYj] 0.013 0.025 0.001 0.023
(0.039) (0.074) (0.048) (0.061)
Dissimilarity of physical capital − 0.529∗ ∗ − 1.024∗ ∗ − 0.130 − 0.030
(0.244) (0.450) (0.341) (0.423)
Dissimilarity of human capital 0.025∗ ∗ ∗ 0.041∗ ∗ ∗ 0.024∗ ∗ 0.022
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Dissimilarity of inﬂation − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 0.496∗ ∗ 1.080∗ ∗ − 0.741 − 1.298
(0.228) (0.466) (0.548) (0.705)
Constant 0.586∗ ∗ 0.780∗ ∗ ∗ 0.400∗ ∗ 0.384
(0.136) (0.256) (0.201) (0.254)
Observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Fig. 2. Interprovince correlation of demand shocks. Notes: The horizontal axis shows correlation coefﬁcients while the vertical axis reports the number of observations
(province pairs) with that correlation. Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
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Table 7
Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, reform period.
1978–1991 1992–2011
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0.031 0.046 0.202∗ ∗ ∗ 0.241∗ ∗ ∗
(0.051) (0.062) (0.057) (0.068)
Coast dummy 0.178∗ ∗ ∗ 0.224∗ ∗ ∗ 0.235∗ ∗ ∗ 0.306∗ ∗ ∗
(0.053) (0.068) (0.080) (0.099)
Same-region dummy − 0.021 − 0.021 − 0.005 − 0.011
(0.041) (0.048) (0.045) (0.053)
Coast-interior dummy 0.017 − 0.018 − 0.202 − 0.249
(0.088) (0.110) (0.112) (0.134)
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] − 0.023 − 0.033 0.021 0.027
(0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029)
Economic size [logYi + logYj] 0.023 0.011 − 0.037 − 0.045
(0.035) (0.044) (0.050) (0.059)
Dissimilarity of physical capital − 1.693∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.071∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.191∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.380∗ ∗ ∗
(0.367) (0.441) (0.393) (0.452)
Dissimilarity of human capital 5.501∗ ∗ 6.002∗ ∗ − 8.027∗ ∗ − 8.739∗ ∗
(2.419) (2.925) (3.863) (4.447)
Dissimilarity of inﬂation 0.016 0.019 0.063∗ ∗ 0.074∗ ∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.031) (0.036)
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 1.139∗ ∗ 1.351∗ ∗ 0.593 0.453
(0.548) (0.662) (0.909) (1.058)
Dissimilarity of trade 0.095 0.089 0.069 0.097
(0.165) (0.197) (0.067) (0.078)
Dissimilarity of FDI − 4.656 − 5.242 − 0.088 − 0.122
(3.788) (4.477) (0.107) (0.117)
Dissimilarity of output structure − 0.163 − 0.157 0.420 0.469
(0.131) (0.153) (0.270) (0.320)
Constant 0.277 0.393 0.310 0.369
(0.171) (0.209) (0.326) (0.381)
Observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
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by increasing symmetry of demand shocks.
Fidrmuc (2013), in contrast, presents amodel of ﬁscal integration inwhich the difference between permanent and temporary out-
put shocks plays an important role (recall that supply shocks affect output permanently while demand shocks only have a temporary
effect). He argues that symmetry of permanent shocks is more important for the stability of integration than symmetry of temporary
shocks: both kinds of shocks give rise to divergent policy preferences but the impact of temporary shocks is (by deﬁnition) short lived
while permanent shocks can fundamentally undermine the stability of integration. In this context, the fact that China is experiencing
falling correlation of supply (permanent) shocksmay come across asworrying, despite themovement in the opposite direction by the
correlation of demand (temporary) shocks.
4. Determinants of business cycle co-movement in China
4.1. Methodology
So far, we have explored the changing nature of business-cycle synchronization during the last ﬁve decades of China's history. In
this section, we investigate the determinants of business cycle co-movements and, thereby, shed some light on the factors behind the
different developments of supply and demand shocks discussed in the preceding section. Our approach is motivated by Artis and
Okubo (2010 and 2011) who were the ﬁrst to apply this kind of framework to identify the determinants of business-cycle similarity
in the inter-regional setting (the UK and Japan, respectively). While Artis and Okubomeasured business-cycle synchronization using
HP ﬁltered GDP correlations, we use the correlations of supply and demand shocks, discussed in the preceding section, as the depen-
dent variables. As Artis and Okubo, we analyze the correlation coefﬁcients using a form of a gravity model, regressing them on the
distance between the two provinces and a number of provincial variables.
The correlations of supply and demand shocks, ρijτS and ρijτD , estimated for provinces i and j during sub-period τ, are deﬁned be-
tween − 1 and + 1 whereas OLS assumes that the dependent variables are unbounded. Therefore, besides using the original
Table 8
Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, Maoist period.
1955–1965 1966–1977
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0.012 0.010 0.064 0.065
(0.080) (0.091) (0.066) (0.075)
Coast dummy 0.110 0.133 − 0.062 − 0.082
(0.095) (0.112) (0.075) (0.083)
Same-region dummy − 0.044 − 0.052 0.007 0.014
(0.061) (0.070) (0.058) (0.068)
Coast-interior dummy − 0.018 − 0.031 − 0.185∗ ∗ − 0.205∗ ∗
(0.135) (0.158) (0.087) (0.094)
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0.003 0.004 − 0.092∗ ∗ − 0.100∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.023) (0.028)
Economic size [logYi + logYj] − 0.135∗ ∗ − 0.153∗ ∗ 0.027 0.031
(0.061) (0.070) (0.066) (0.078)
Dissimilarity of physical capital − 0.569 − 0.684 − 0.667 − 0.743
(0.442) (0.514) (0.429) (0.507)
Dissimilarity of human capital − 0.016 − 0.019 0.057 0.062
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.039)
Dissimilarity of inﬂation − 0.003 − 0.004 − 0.003 − 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 0.368 0.403 − 0.087 − 0.126
(0.349) (0.404) (0.656) (0.739)
Constant 0.568∗ ∗ ∗ 0.652∗ ∗ ∗ 0.194 0.215
(0.218) (0.249) (0.273) (0.328)
Observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
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These are not bounded from above or below:14 The
coast anz ¼ 1
2
log
1þ ρi jτ
1−ρi jτ
 !
ð4ÞTo explain the degree of shock synchronization between pairs of provinces,we introduce awide range of explanatory variables. As
we highlight in the discussion of the determinants of business-cycle co-movements, bilateral trade intensity is likely to increase the
synchronization of business cycles between provinces. Data on internal trade ﬂows in any country, however, are notoriously difﬁcult
to obtain: unlike foreign trade, internal trade ﬂows attract little ofﬁcial scrutiny and may be difﬁcult to measure (for instance, intra-
ﬁrm deliveries crossing provincial borders are unlikely to be included in ofﬁcial statistics on interprovincial trade, even if such statis-
tics are collected). There is abundant evidence in the existing literature that the gravity model explains bilateral trade very well (see,
for example, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006); deHaan et al. (2008b); Frankel and Rose (1998)).We therefore include the following com-
monly used gravity variables: dummy for a common border (equal to (0.031) for adjacent provinces), same-region dummy (equal to
0.074∗ ∗when two provinces belong to the same region: East, Center andWest), coast and interior-coast dummies14 (equal to (0.036)
when both provinces are located in the coastal region and when one province is on the coast while the other lies in the interior, re-
spectively), bilateral distance (the shortest distance for freight transportation by railway in kilometers), and economic size (measured
as the sum of the two provincial GDPs, logYi + logYj).
Regions specializing in producing similar goods are likely to be exposed to similar shocks. There is, however, no standardmeasure
of similarity in the production structure. Following Clark and vanWincoop (2001), Imbs (2004) and Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008),
we compute Krugman's (1991) absolute value index. Let Sni and Snj denote the GDP shares for industry n in provinces i and j. Then, the
dissimilarity of the two provinces' production structures is measured as1
N
XN
n¼1
Sni−Sn j
 se two dummies should reveal up whether business cycles are more closely synchronized among coast provinces (captured by the coast dummy), between
d interior provinces (coast-interior dummy), or among interior provinces (omitted category).
Table 10
Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, Maoist period.
1955–1965 1966–1977
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0:029
0:032ð Þ
0:003½ 
0:051
0:063ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:039
0:044ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:047
0:056ð Þ
0:002½ 
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0:004
0:01ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:001
0:022ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:006
0:015ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:006
0:019ð Þ
0:000½ 
Economic size [logYi + logYj] 0:022
0:026ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:043
0:052ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:005
0:036ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:012
0:046ð Þ
0:000½ 
Dissimilarity of capital investment −0:326
0:170ð Þ
0:011½ 
−0:599
0:336ð Þ
0:010½ 
−0:291
0:238ð Þ
0:005½ 
−0:358
0:304ð Þ
0:004½ 
Dissimilarity of human capital 0:020
0:017ð Þ
0:004½ 
0:033
0:034ð Þ
0:003½ 
0:023
0:047ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:018
0:060ð Þ
0:000½ 
Dissimilarity of inﬂation −0:001
0:002ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:002
0:003ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:003
0:002ð Þ
0:005½ 
−0:003
0:003ð Þ
0:004½ 
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 0:213
0:188ð Þ
0:004½ 
0:541
0:371ð Þ
0:007½ 
−0:695
0:529ð Þ
0:005½ 
−1:182
0:674ð Þ
0:009½ 
Observations 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 9
Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, reform period.
1978–1991 1992–2011
o z o z
Common-border dummy − 0.039 − 0.040 − 0.013 − 0.033
(0.050) (0.063) (0.023) (0.050)
Coast dummy 0.152∗ ∗ ∗ 0.192∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.032 − 0.058
(0.059) (0.075) (0.031) (0.063)
Same-region dummy − 0.096∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.127∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.010 − 0.011
(0.035) (0.043) (0.018) (0.039)
Coast-interior dummy 0.037 0.070 − 0.050 − 0.115
(0.096) (0.126) (0.033) (0.070)
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] − 0.071∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.098∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.027∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.058∗ ∗ ∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.008) (0.017)
Economic size [logYi + logYj] − 0.159∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.200∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.035 − 0.074
(0.037) (0.049) (0.017) (0.039)
Dissimilarity of physical capital 0.525 0.637 0.058 0.080
(0.382) (0.507) (0.133) (0.272)
Dissimilarity of human capital 0.774 2.157 − 3.117∗ ∗ − 6.436∗ ∗
(2.406) (3.033) (1.288) (2.655)
Dissimilarity of inﬂation 0.069∗ ∗ ∗ 0.092∗ ∗ ∗ 0.018∗ ∗ 0.029
(0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.021)
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials − 0.315 − 0.353 − 0.260 − 0.305
(0.559) (0.694) (0.318) (0.675)
Dissimilarity of trade − 0.168 − 0.176 0.010 0.012
(0.185) (0.241) (0.022) (0.044)
Dissimilarity of FDI − 2.197 − 3.911 − 0.051 − 0.121
(3.817) (4.985) (0.058) (0.124)
Dissimilarity of output structure − 0.088 − 0.145 − 0.079 − 0.261
(0.119) (0.150) (0.087) (0.209)
Constant 1.132∗ ∗ ∗ 1.383∗ ∗ ∗ 0.593∗ ∗ ∗ 1.607∗ ∗ ∗
(0.176) (0.231) (0.153) (0.251)
Observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
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Table 11
Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, reform period.
1978–1991 1992–2011
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0:022
0:037ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:045
0:045ð Þ
0:003½ 
0:125
0:049ð Þ
0:017½ 
0:144
0:058ð Þ
0:016½ 
Same-region dummy 0:039
0:029ð Þ
0:005½ 
0:058
0:036ð Þ
0:007½ 
0:089
0:039ð Þ
0:013½ 
0:108
0:046ð Þ
0:015½ 
Coast dummy 0:206
0:046ð Þ
0:051½ 
0:257
0:056ð Þ
0:054½ 
0:187
0:062ð Þ
0:024½ 
0:252
0:073ð Þ
0:031½ 
Coast-interior dummy 0:033
0:070ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:052
0:085ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:037
0:094ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:052
0:110ð Þ
0:001½ 
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] −0:022
0:013ð Þ
0:007½ 
−0:034
0:016ð Þ
0:010½ 
0:003
0:018ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:003
0:021ð Þ
0:000½ 
Economic size [logYi + logYj] 0:117
0:030ð Þ
0:038½ 
0:135
0:037ð Þ
0:035½ 
0:034
0:035ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:051
0:041ð Þ
0:004½ 
Dissimilarity of capital investment −0:205
0:240ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:223
0:291ð Þ
0:002½ 
−1:171
0:371ð Þ
0:026½ 
−1:383
0:435ð Þ
0:026½ 
Dissimilarity of ﬁxed assets investment −1:725
0:346ð Þ
0:062½ 
−2:077
0:419ð Þ
0:061½ 
−0:737
0:307ð Þ
0:015½ 
−0:835
0:360ð Þ
0:014½ 
Dissimilarity of human capital 0:512
1:856ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:188
2:249ð Þ
0:000½ 
−9:083
3:888ð Þ
0:014½ 
−10:247
4:563ð Þ
0:013½ 
Dissimilarity of inﬂation 0:008
0:012ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:007
0:015ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:054
0:028ð Þ
0:010½ 
0:064
0:033ð Þ
0:010½ 
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 0:542
0:349ð Þ
0:006½ 
0:680
0:422ð Þ
0:007½ 
−0:308
0:779ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:590
0:914ð Þ
0:001½ 
Dissimilarity of output structure 0:070
0:076ð Þ
0:002½ 
0:092
0:092ð Þ
0:003½ 
0:102
0:208ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:117
0:244ð Þ
0:001½ 
Dissimilarity of FDI 2:207
2:440ð Þ
0:002½ 
2:465
2:958ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:143
0:199ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:164
0:233ð Þ
0:001½ 
Dissimilarity of trade 0:167
0:106ð Þ
0:007½ 
0:190
0:128ð Þ
0:006½ 
0:031
0:046ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:051
0:054ð Þ
0:002½ 
Observations 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
106 S. Huang et al. / China Economic Review 33 (2015) 94–110To compute the index, we consider ﬁve broad sectors of the Chinese economy: primary sector (comprising agriculture, hunting,
forestry, ﬁshing, and mining and quarrying); construction; manufacturing; infrastructure services (transportation, post and telecom-
munications); and trade services (wholesale, retail and catering).15
Another potential source of asymmetric shocks is represented by local policymaking. Dissimilarity of local policies is measured by
means of two indicators. One captures the provincial divergence of ﬁscal policywhile the other investigates heterogeneity in terms of
inﬂation. Similar to Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008), we use the standard deviation of provincial
budget deﬁcit differentials to measure the dissimilarity of ﬁscal policy (with annual budget deﬁcits expressed as percentages of
GDP). We capture provincial divergence in inﬂation as15 The1
T
XT
t¼1
GPIi;t−GPI j;t
 (see also Poncet and Barthėlemy (2008)), where GPIi,t is the general price index of the province i during the period t and T is the sub-
period time span.
A major source of divergence of business cycles can be the exposure to foreign trade and foreign direct investment. We measure
the foreign trade dissimilarity as1
T
XT
t¼1
Tradei;t−Tradej;t
 data are taken from the Chinese national statistic year book.
Table 12
Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, Maoist period.
1955–1965 1966–1977
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0:011
0:059ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:007
0:068ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:159
0:054ð Þ
0:023½ 
0:171
0:062ð Þ
0:023½ 
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0:001
0:020ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:002
0:024ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:104
0:018ð Þ
0:094½ 
−0:114
0:021ð Þ
0:087½ 
Economic size [logYi + logYj] −0:051
0:048ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:052
0:056ð Þ
0:003½ 
0:118
0:044ð Þ
0:022½ 
0:129
0:050ð Þ
0:020½ 
Dissimilarity of capital investment −0:019
0:315ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:060
0:366ð Þ
0:000½ 
−1:091
0:292ð Þ
0:042½ 
−1:215
0:333ð Þ
0:040½ 
Dissimilarity of human capital −0:006
0:032ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:008
0:037ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:063
0:059ð Þ
0:004½ 
−0:068
0:067ð Þ
0:003½ 
Dissimilarity of inﬂation −0:003
0:003ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:003
0:003ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:003
0:003ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:003
0:003ð Þ
0:003½ 
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials 0:200
0:347ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:209
0:404ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:750
0:661ð Þ
0:004½ 
−0:913
0:754ð Þ
0:005½ 
Observations 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
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span. An analogous formula is used for FDI dissimilarity.
Finally, differences in factor endowments can also play a role in explaining the degree of business-cycle synchronization.We con-
sider two factors of production: investments in human capital andﬁxed-assets. Investment in human capital ismeasured as secondary
and higher education enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the total secondary and higher education enrolment to the population). Invest-
ment in physical capital is expressed as a percentage of GDP. For the pre-1978 period, we only have public investment (private invest-
ment during this period is likely to be very low or zero). After 1978, the data distinguish between total investment in physical capital
(including public investment) and public investment only. For the general regressions, we include only total investment, whereaswe
use both types of investment in the univariate regressions. Both investments (human and physical capital) are entered as dissimilarity
indexes computed in the same way as those for production structures, inﬂation and trade discussed above.
Thus, we estimate the following regressions for correlation of supply or demand shocks between all Chinese provinces for the four
sub-periodsρk; fi jτ ¼ Xi jτβk; f þ μk; fi jτ ð5ÞThe dependent variable is either the correlation of supply and demand shocks (k= S,D) or its Fisher z-transformation (denoted by
superscript f= o, z, respectively). X is the vector of explanatory variables discussed above and βk,f is the coefﬁcient vector to be esti-
mated. All variables are taken as average values for the respective sub-period. We ﬁrst include all variables in a multivariate regres-
sion. Alternatively, we consider separate relationships between correlation of shocks and the various potential determinants, one
explanatory variable at a time. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
4.2. Empirical results
Tables 6 to 9 present the general regression results (with all variables) for each sub-period, for the correlations of shocks and their
Fisher-z transformations. Themain ﬁnding concerning supply shocks during theMaoist period (Table 6) is that hardly any of the var-
iables explain the interprovincial correlations of supply shocks in China. The overall explanatory power of the regressions estimated
for this period is extremely low: the joint F-test is only signiﬁcant for the second regression (with Fisher z-transformation for 1955–
1965). The only gravity variable that appears to play any role is the dummy for coastal regions in 1955–1965 and its sign goes against
our expectations: provinces located along the coast display lower symmetry of shocks than the rest. The dissimilarity in investment in
physical capital lowers the correlation of supply shocks, signiﬁcantly so during the early part of the Maoist period. Overall, economic
determinants seem to matter little for business cycle synchronization during the Maoist era.
The picture becomes clearer during the reform period (Table 7). Adjacent regions and those located on the coast display higher
correlations of supply shocks (however, the common-border dummy is only signiﬁcant during the 1992–1911 period). The dissimi-
larity in investment in physical capital continues to lower the correlation of supply shocks during both sub-periods, in line with
expectations: regions with different patterns of investment have their business cycles less synchronized.
Table 13
Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, reform period.
1978–1991 1992–2011
o z o z
Common-border dummy 0:019
0:037ð Þ
0:00109½ 
0:041
0:046ð Þ
0:0021½ 
0:012
0:017ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:026
0:035ð Þ
0:001½ 
Same-region dummy −0:022
0:029ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:030
0:037ð Þ
0:008½ 
0:003
0:013ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:020
0:028ð Þ
0:001½ 
Coast dummy −0:016
0:046ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:023
0:059ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:038
0:021ð Þ
0:009½ 
−0:068
0:044ð Þ
0:006½ 
Coast-interior dummy 0:041
0:069ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:090
0:087ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:026
0:032ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:074
0:066ð Þ
0:003½ 
Railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] −0:022
0:013ð Þ
0:007½ 
−0:033
0:017ð Þ
0:010½ 
−0:016
0:006ð Þ
0:018½ 
−0:034
0:013ð Þ
0:019½ 
Economic size [logYi + logYj] −0:116
0:030ð Þ
0:039½ 
−0:143
0:038ð Þ
0:037½ 
−0:025
0:012ð Þ
0:012½ 
−0:057
0:025ð Þ
0:014½ 
Dissimilarity of capital investment 0:328
0:235ð Þ
0:005½ 
0:335
0:299ð Þ
0:003½ 
−0:015
0:128ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:142
0:265ð Þ
0:001½ 
Dissimilarity of ﬁxed assets investment 0:721
0:348ð Þ
0:011½ 
0:862
0:443ð Þ
0:010½ 
0:027
0:105ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:003
0:218ð Þ
0:000½ 
Dissimilarity of human capital −0:958
1:820ð Þ
0:001½ 
−1:09
2:32ð Þ
0:001½ 
−2:108
1:325ð Þ
0:007½ 
−4:550
2:750ð Þ
0:007½ 
Dissimilarity of inﬂation 0:040
0:012ð Þ
0:029½ 
0:053
0:015ð Þ
0:032½ 
0:006
0:010ð Þ
0:001½ 
0:001
0:020ð Þ
0:000½ 
Standard deviation of ﬁscal deﬁcit differentials −0:694
0:341ð Þ
0:011½ 
−0:921
0:434ð Þ
0:012½ 
−0:151
0:264ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:249
0:549ð Þ
0:001½ 
Dissimilarity of output structure −0:150
0:074ð Þ
0:011½ 
−0:200
0:094ð Þ
0:012½ 
−0:065
0:071ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:191
0:146ð Þ
0:005½ 
Dissimilarity of FDI 0:257
2:397ð Þ
0:000½ 
0:288
3:050ð Þ
0:000½ 
−0:047
0:068ð Þ
0:001½ 
−0:134
0:140ð Þ
0:002½ 
Dissimilarity of trade −0:151
0:104ð Þ
0:006½ 
−0:185
0:132ð Þ
0:005½ 
−0:013
0:016ð Þ
0:002½ 
−0:043
0:033ð Þ
0:005½ 
Observations 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o) and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-
border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border and belong to the same region (East, Central orWest), respectively. The coast and coast-interior
dummies denote provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is railway freight distance in
kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of variable X is deﬁned as 1K∑
K
n¼1 Xin−X jn
 , where K counts the sectors/periods
and X stands for physical capital, human capital, inﬂation, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
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variables explain the similarity between provincial shocks during the early Maoist period (and again, the explanatory variables are
not jointly signiﬁcant for this period). During the later Maoist period, 1966–1977, we see that the correlation of shocks falls with dis-
tance. Much clearer picture again emerges during the reform period, especially the early sub-period, 1978–1991. The degree of cor-
relation of demand shocks again falls with distance (more so during the early reform period). Regions located on the coast tend to
encounter similar shocks during the early reform period. However, this is counterbalanced by the negative coefﬁcient estimated for
the same-region dummy during the same period. This surprising result may reﬂect a dichotomy between the regional centers and
their surrounding rural areas. Economic size appears to lower the symmetry of shocks during the early reform period: two relatively
large provinceswould be expected to display a lower degree of symmetry of demand shocks than two small provinces. Dissimilarity of
investment in physical capital no longer affects synchronization of shocks, whereas dissimilarity in human capital appears to lower
synchronization of shocks during the late reform period, 1992–1911.
Several variables are notable for being consistently insigniﬁcant: dissimilarity indexes with respect to the output structures, expo-
sure to trade and incoming FDI apparent to have no impact on the symmetry of supply or demand shocks. This is somewhat surprising,
especially for trade and FDI, given the extraordinary importance of external economic relations for the post-1978 economic develop-
ment (Huang (2011), for example, ﬁnds that exposure to FDI is an important determinant of economic growth of Chinese regions). A
possible explanation of this absence is that the shocks attributable to foreign trade and FDI affectmost of China inmuch the sameway
(or else that their effects quickly spillover across regions).
Some of the variables included in the preceding regressions are likely to be collinear with each other and this could explain their
low signiﬁcance. Therefore, in Tables 10–13, we report the results of univariate regressions between the correlations of supply and
demand shocks, respectively, and each variable considered. Few explanatory variables appear signiﬁcant during the Maoist period
again. Nevertheless, common border, distance and output size shape the correlation of demand shocks during the late Maoist period:
demand shocks become less symmetric with distance while their similarity is higher for adjacent and for larger provinces. Provinces
sharing a common border, those located in the same region and those on the coast also appearmore similar during the reform period
109S. Huang et al. / China Economic Review 33 (2015) 94–110(though the coefﬁcients are not always signiﬁcant). The effect of distance is similarly negative but it is not always signiﬁcant. Econom-
ic size is not a signiﬁcant determinant of supply shockswhereas it appears negatively related to the correlation of demand shocks dur-
ing the reform period.
5. Conclusion
The Chinese society has experienced numerous dramatic changes during the last ﬁve decades: the communist take-over, the up-
heavals of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and ﬁnally economic liberalization and opening up to the outside world
and the rapid growth that this has generated. In this paper, we document the impact of these changes on the Chinese regional econ-
omies and on the degree of economic integration among them. The picture that our results paint is mixed: as the reforms progress,
Chinese provinces encounter increasingly symmetric demand shocks but also increasingly asymmetric supply shocks. This is poten-
tially worrying: supply shocks lead to permanent economic differentials, unlike demand shocks, and therefore their falling similarity
may undermine the stability of Chinese economic integration in the future. This may translate into growing economic and political
tensions in the future, especially if appropriate adjustment channels are not introduced (for example, greater liberalization of migra-
tion between provinces). The experience of countries such as Belgium, Spain or Czechoslovakia demonstrates the dangers that grow-
ing economic divergence can pose serious danger for political unity of countries, especially ethnically diverse ones.
We relate the interprovincial correlations of supply and demand shocks to a broad range of economic variables butwe again obtain
at best mixed results. Little explains the synchronization of business cycles during the Maoist period, especially during its early part,
1955–1965. The limited explanatory power of economic factors should perhaps not be surprising, given that the Maoist period was
dominated by politically-induced shocks of theGreat Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. During the reformperiod, factors typical-
ly associated with bilateral (interprovincial) trade matter, although their importance is not overwhelming. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the symmetry of both demand and supply shocks tends to fall with the distance between provinces and rises when provinces share a
border or are located in the same region.Weﬁnd also that provinces that experience similar patterns of investment in physical capital
tend to encounter similar supply shocks. In contrast, similarity in investment in physical capital tends to make demand shocks less
similar, possibly because investment behavior is itself driven by demand shocks. Hence, interprovincial trade increases the symmetry
of both demand and supply shocks while investment in physical capital has opposite effects on supply and demand shocks. Finally,
and rather surprisingly, we ﬁnd little evidence that inward FDI and foreign trade affect the synchronization of demand or supply
shocks, even though these are among the main factors highlighted as drivers of the recent Chinese growth.
Clearly, our analysis fails to account for a number of factors that can also contribute to the on-going divergence of permanent
shocks in China. Chinese provinces may specialize in a relatively narrow range of products but our data only distinguish very coarse
categories of output structure.Migration is an important channelmitigating asymmetric shocks butwe do not have any (reliable) data
on this. Moreover, migration in China is still highly constrained by the continued enforcement of the hukou system of household
registrationwhich limits mobility of workers and their entitlement to public goods. Finally, the role of the special economic zones de-
serves closer attention as the SEZs have effectively enjoyed a substantial head start over the rest of China. This, however,might require
more disaggregate data than those that we have: the SEZs typically account only for a relatively small portion of the province inwhich
they are located. Finally, the futurewill showwhether supply shocks affectingChinese regionswill continue to diverge orwhether this
trend will be reversed.
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